We investigate the contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining the stock price reaction to an exogenous event: sudden deaths of directors. Compiling an extensive database of sudden deaths of 270 directors in the U.S. from 1994 to 2007, we find that following the death of an independent director, the firm’s stock price drops by almost 1 % on average. For our control sample of inside or gray directors, we find that stock prices do not react in any significant way to these events. This difference in abnormal returns following the sudden deaths of independent, gray and inside directors is statistically and economically significant. Positions in board, experience, age, and educational backgrounds are the main determi...
[[abstract]]In 2002, the Taiwanese government regulated that new companies should appoint independen...
We examine the impact on firm value of independent directors based on Taiwanese firms. Using the cha...
Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors per se is not tied to performance inc...
Deaths of executives provide a special case to explore management turnover since the decision to lea...
Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with more powerful i...
Between 1950 and 2005, the composition of large public company boards dramatically shifted towards i...
We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional settin...
This article presents a study which examined the direction of stock returns after reports of sudden ...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm.We find t...
The main purpose of this project is to investigate if the sudden death of an executive will affect t...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm. We find ...
Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. However...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm. We find ...
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue Research Findings/Insights Using the US setting fr...
Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor mar...
[[abstract]]In 2002, the Taiwanese government regulated that new companies should appoint independen...
We examine the impact on firm value of independent directors based on Taiwanese firms. Using the cha...
Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors per se is not tied to performance inc...
Deaths of executives provide a special case to explore management turnover since the decision to lea...
Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with more powerful i...
Between 1950 and 2005, the composition of large public company boards dramatically shifted towards i...
We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional settin...
This article presents a study which examined the direction of stock returns after reports of sudden ...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm.We find t...
The main purpose of this project is to investigate if the sudden death of an executive will affect t...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm. We find ...
Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. However...
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm. We find ...
Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue Research Findings/Insights Using the US setting fr...
Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor mar...
[[abstract]]In 2002, the Taiwanese government regulated that new companies should appoint independen...
We examine the impact on firm value of independent directors based on Taiwanese firms. Using the cha...
Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors per se is not tied to performance inc...