Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environ-ments where utility is not fully t...
We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing s...
In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types a...
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfec...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (malesand females) ca...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully tr...
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environ-ments where utility is not fully t...
We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing s...
In Becker’s (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortative if types a...
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfec...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (malesand females) ca...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
This paper modifies and extends the aggregate equilibrium models for matching markets developed earl...
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on sear...
We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about ind...
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with tran...