Public Opinion, Rational Choice and the New Institutionalism: Rational Choice as a Critical

Studies on the nature of public opinion and its impact on public policy, while borrowing from Rational Choice’s methodological individualism and rational actor assumptions, often fail to take into account the wider implications of rational choice theorizing for the Opinion-Policy Nexus. In this paper we use Rational Choice Theory to criticize the mass society approach to Public Opinion and Policy. Particularly important, but often overlooked by Public Opinion scholars, are Public Choice findings on rational ignorance, the spatial theory of preferences, Intransitivity, Heresthetics, and Collective Action Problems. These theories suggest the vulnerability of mass-opinion, a positivist construct, to elite rhetorical manipulation. Riker’s conclusion in favour of Liberalism over Populism, paralleled in the debate over the need for elite leadership of the public versus democratic responsiveness to polls, suggests that Public Opinion scholars might also reconsider the validity of mass opinion polls as the dominant construct of public opinion. Also within the Rational Choice framework, the findings of Neo-Institutionalism may suggest the applicability of some alternative forms of public input into the policy process. Résumé Bien qu’elles empruntent à la perspective du choix rationnel l’individualisme méthodologique e