Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely speaking, this means the payments of the winners could be so low, that there are losing bidders who would have been willing to pay more than the payments of the winning bidders. Clearly, this “unfair” outcome is unacceptable for a public-sector auction. Proxy-based combinatorial auctions, in which each bidder submits several package bids to a proxy, result in efficient outcomes and bidder-Pareto-optimal core-payments by winners, thus off...
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget con...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new ...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
The allocation of public goods such as the radio spectrum is a difficult task that the government mu...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Combinatorial auctions address the fundamental problem of allocating multiple items in the presence ...
Combinatorial auctions are very useful in theory, but their applicability in practice has been limi...
We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem ...
We address the mechanism design problem of supply chain formation—the problem of ne-gotiation mechan...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that compute opti...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
We explore interesting potential extensions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule under the assump...
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget con...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new ...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
The allocation of public goods such as the radio spectrum is a difficult task that the government mu...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
Combinatorial auctions address the fundamental problem of allocating multiple items in the presence ...
Combinatorial auctions are very useful in theory, but their applicability in practice has been limi...
We present and analyze a mechanism for the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP). The problem ...
We address the mechanism design problem of supply chain formation—the problem of ne-gotiation mechan...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that compute opti...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
We explore interesting potential extensions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule under the assump...
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget con...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new ...