Who formulates the European Employment Guidelines?

This paper provides an analysis of the process leading to the formulation of the 2003 European Employment Guidelines and the strategic behaviour of the actors involved. I thereby presume that the Commission on the one side and the member states on the other side have diverse institutional self-interests in the process. By focusing on the underlying interest conflicts and power-relations, the paper challenges the concept of the European Employment Strategy as a predominantly deliberative process. In this context, the question was whether the formulation of the guidelines was dominated by the Commission, using its agenda-setting power, or of it fits more in the row of intergovernmental decision making via intermediate bodies such like the Employment Committee. As the analysis shows, the commission did indeed make intensive use of their agenda-setting power, aiming to open up gateways for future member state-critique in form of more quantitative targets in the guidelines. Contrary to this aim, a considerable number of member states indicated continuous opposition against the commission’s proposal. As decisions had to be made, the commission dispensed from most of its proposed targets as both actors had no interest in a failure of the procedure. In light of the results, the paper argues for a stronger emphasis on power relations and interest-politics when it comes to the study of new forms of governance via “soft-law”