Judgments of social justice: Compromises between equality and efficiency

Political economists agree that a trade-offexists between equality and efficiency. Using a hypotheti-cal society paradigm, we manipulated the mean income (representing efficiency) and income variability (representing equality) of distributions of wealth and the correlation between wealth and effort within a society. Subjects made all pairwise comparisons of distributions within societies of differing meritocracy. A "maximin " principle best described trade-off resolution strategies when effort and outcome were weakly linked: People maximized the minimum standard of living within a society. A compromise principle best described preferences when income was tightly linked to effort: People rejected distributions in which some citizens fell below the "poverty line " but maxi-mized efficiency above this constraint. Ideological polarization was pronounced under moderate meritocracy; here liberals could focus on the role of chance and conservatives on the role of effort and ability. A central tension in theories of distributive justice is the trade-off between equality of wealth distribution and effi-ciency of wealth generation (see Bowie, 1971; McConnell, 1987; Okun, 1975). On the one hand, to promote social equality, mos