Closing the Gap? Some Questions for

Please consult the published version for purposes of quotation. In his 1996 paper “Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem”, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela’s call has not gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. Indeed, this very journal is, in large part, a testimony to the rise of neurophenomenology. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is.2 What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive research programme? My aim in this paper is not so much to answer these questions as to provoke neurophenomenologists into answering them