The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for decision-making environments where majority rule is being used. It coincides with the core when the core exists, and is always a subset of the Pareto set. Theory suggests that sophisticated decision makers using majority rule will propose only outcomes in the uncovered set. A difficulty in computing the uncovered set for any particular set of spatial preferences has been an obstacle to rigorous laboratory experiments on the uncovered set as a solution concept. Recently, researchers developed a grid search based method to estimate the uncovered set at a satisfactory level of precision. This paper reports computer-mediated, free-communication, five-person laboratory expe...
Many voting rules—including single-valued, set-valued, and probabilistic rules—only take into accoun...
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown tha...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. Thi...
Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an ...
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the followin...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered ...
In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable experimental support exists for the co...
Democratic simple majority voting is perhaps the most widely used method of group decision making in...
We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In equilibrium, as i...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In equilibrium, as i...
Using a choice-experiment in the lab, we look at preferences over pairs of income distributions with...
In light of the so-called 'chaos theorems' from social choice theory, William Riker (W. H. Freeman a...
Many voting rules—including single-valued, set-valued, and probabilistic rules—only take into accoun...
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown tha...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. Thi...
Social choice theory demonstrates that majority rule is generically indeterminate. However, from an ...
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the followin...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered ...
In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable experimental support exists for the co...
Democratic simple majority voting is perhaps the most widely used method of group decision making in...
We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In equilibrium, as i...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In equilibrium, as i...
Using a choice-experiment in the lab, we look at preferences over pairs of income distributions with...
In light of the so-called 'chaos theorems' from social choice theory, William Riker (W. H. Freeman a...
Many voting rules—including single-valued, set-valued, and probabilistic rules—only take into accoun...
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown tha...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...