Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bar-gain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these de-lays can have substantial political and economic consequences, we know surprisingly little about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradic-tory conclusions. In this article, I examine how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in sixteen West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with my theoretical ex-pectations, I find that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments, but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. My analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature