Abstract: Academic contracts in the UK are characterised by wages that rise with annual increments and guaranteed future employment. In a model based on the arrival of outside offers, it is shown how such seniority wages can arise in both competitive labour markets and when the employer enjoys some monopsony power. The model is then reinterpreted to introduce risk about future productivity. In this framework, it is shown that seniority wages can co-exist with the rational offer of a tenure contract by the firm. Key-words: long-term contracts, tenure, wage profil
This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portug...
A wage offer can be either acceptable or unacceptable to a worker, but in cross-sectional and panel ...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...
textabstractThis study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. Fi...
"The paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the application of collective co...
This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers se...
1This is a preliminary version. Comments most welcome. The objective of this study is to analyze and...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where \u85rms post wage/tenure contracts and ri...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where \u85rms post wage/tenure contracts and ri...
In this paper we analyse the structure of wages of workers in contract firms for a two-period econom...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm...
Two essential aspects of many employment relationships are, (1) that they are meant to last a long t...
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and e...
This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portug...
A wage offer can be either acceptable or unacceptable to a worker, but in cross-sectional and panel ...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...
textabstractThis study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. Fi...
"The paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the application of collective co...
This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers se...
1This is a preliminary version. Comments most welcome. The objective of this study is to analyze and...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where \u85rms post wage/tenure contracts and ri...
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where \u85rms post wage/tenure contracts and ri...
In this paper we analyse the structure of wages of workers in contract firms for a two-period econom...
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering w...
A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm...
Two essential aspects of many employment relationships are, (1) that they are meant to last a long t...
This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and e...
This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portug...
A wage offer can be either acceptable or unacceptable to a worker, but in cross-sectional and panel ...
A dynamic, equilibrium model of long term (implicit) labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric...