Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators

Do legislators remain at one point on the ideological spectrum for their entire careers, or do they update their ideological positions in response to the demands of constituents? Although theories of the electoral connection predict that legislators should adapt to voter demands, most empirical studies instead show that they maintain consistent positions in the face of changing political conditions. This article takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by California’s 2003 recall election—held at the midpoint of the state’s legislative session—to investigate the impact of a strong electoral signal that is isolated from other political changes. We show that after the results of the recall signaled a surge in support for the Republican Party, Democratic legislators, particularly those in the most competi-tive districts, moderated their voting behavior in an apparent case of ideological adaptation. “[M]embers of Congress die in their ideological boots. That is, based upon the roll call voting record, once elected to Congress, members adopt an ideological posi-tion and maintain that position throughout their careers.” —Keith Poole (1998, p. 3) Acentral tenet of American legislative scholar-ship over the last 30 years holds that legislatorsare predominately, if not single-mindedly, motivated by electoral incentives. This notion is echoed by the popular media, which often characterize legislators as pandering or lacking political courage. Yet there is little empirical evidence that legislators actually adjust their voting behavior in response to partisan and ideological shifts in the electorate. Poole’s (1998) frequently cited conclusion that members of Congress maintain consistent ideological positions through their often long tenures is consistent with a large number of studies which find that members generally do not adapt their ideological positions in response to changes in their electoral environments. Whether the change in electoral condition is the result of redistricting (Poole 1998; Poole and Romer 1993), a switch in office (Grofman, Griffin, and Berry 1995), or the removal of the electoral constraint through th