Cyber-Ethics: Bodies or Bytes? by

Information ethics requires (1) an ethical theory that recognizes the importance of the body, and (2) a materialist theory of information. Alasdair MacIntyre’s ethics of acknowledged dependence is an example of the former. It holds that the virtues we need to achieve both personal and common moral goods recognize networks of dependence based upon bodily vulnerability and disability. Pierre Lévy’s theory of collective intelligence is an example of a view that disregards both requirements. Based upon a secular appropriation of the angelology of the tenth to twelfth centuries, it holds that in cyberspace, social relations are dematerialized, and that information is an incorporeal substance flowing between disembodied minds. The new anthropological space of disembodied social agents that Lévy holds to be ushered in by new electronic information technologies requires a radical rethinking of ethics. But on close inspection, his information ethics turns out to be stripped of any serious moral dimension. To address serious moral issues, information ethics cannot abstract from our bodily, animal nature. Several recent studies recognize that information is an effect of social relations between embodied subjects. They provide the materialist information theory required for a meaningfu