A-theory for B-theorists

The debate between A-theory and B-theory in the philosophy of time is a persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate are. A-theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, or that presentness is a property (Williams 1996); that time passes, tense is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity (Bigelow 1991); or that events or facts (as opposed to language) are “tensed ” (Mellor 1993). B-theorists then argue that the A-theory is incoherent, using variants on J.M.E. McTag-gart’s argument for the unreality of time (McTaggart 1927, ch. 33). While I am a card-carrying B-theorist, it strikes me that there is something unfair about this procedure. We should be very surprised to find a single doctrine (as opposed to a large system) incoherent in itself, especially one as popular as the A-theory. In this paper, I argue that the A-theory can be distinguished from the miscellaneous doctrines with which it is often associated (section 1); and that, once so distinguished, it is not shown to be incoherent by the standard arguments (section 2). Finally, I argue, assuming the A-theory, for a comprehensive theory of time that also include