IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific journals for their final publication. * Thanks are due to José Alcalde, J.V. Llinares and M.C. Sánchez, for helpful comments. The comments and suggestions of a referee's report have improved the work; we are most grateful to her/him. Financia
We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous...
In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested' i.e. care only about 'own' utilit...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
IVIE working papers o¤er in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
International audienceA Condorcet social choice function is a voting rule that always elects the Con...
Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they ...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class o...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
The Working Paper series is intended for rapid dissemination of research results, work-in-progress, ...
International audienceThe Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defe...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
International audienceIn this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggreg...
We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous...
In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested' i.e. care only about 'own' utilit...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...
IVIE working papers o¤er in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
International audienceA Condorcet social choice function is a voting rule that always elects the Con...
Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they ...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class o...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
The Working Paper series is intended for rapid dissemination of research results, work-in-progress, ...
International audienceThe Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defe...
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourag...
International audienceIn this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggreg...
We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with majority voting, exogenous...
In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested' i.e. care only about 'own' utilit...
Centro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN ...