Monitoring the Initial DNS Behavior of Malicious Domains

Attackers often use URLs to advertise scams or propagate mal-ware. Because the reputation of a domain can be used to identify malicious behavior, miscreants often register these domains “just in time ” before an attack. This paper explores the DNS behav-ior of attack domains, as identified by appearance in a spam trap, shortly after the domains were registered. We explore the behav-ioral properties of these domains from two perspectives: (1) the DNS infrastructure associated with the domain, as is observable from the resource records; and (2) the DNS lookup patterns from networks who are looking up the domains initially. Our analysis yields many findings that may ultimately be useful for early de-tection of malicious domains. By monitoring the infrastructure for these malicious domains, we find that about 55 % of scam domains occur in attacks at least one day after registration, suggesting the potential for early discovery of malicious domains, solely based on properties of the DNS infrastructure that resolves those domains. We also find that there are a few regions of IP address space that host name servers and other types of servers for only malicious domains. Malicious domains have resource records that are dis-tributed more widely across IP address space, and they are more quickly looked up by a variety of different networks. We also iden-tify a set of “tainted ” ASes that are used heavily by bad domains to host resource records. The features we observe are often evident before any attack even takes place; ultimately, they might serve as the basis for a DNS-based early warning system for attacks