We use laboratory experiments to evaluate how contestability fares in a situation where the entrant and the incumbent have their own home markets and opportunities to enter each other’s markets. The disciplining effect in contestable markets depends crucially on hit-and-run entry. If both the entrant and the incumbent firm have their own home markets then the entrant might not like to hit-and-run. Although an entrant can still “hit ” in the incumbent’s market it cannot quite “run ” since the incumbent can enter to “hit ” the entrant in its own market. Our results suggest that the contestability result depends crucially on the relative profits in the entrant’s home and entry markets. We find that if an entrant has its own monopoly market, th...
The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the...
This paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive deals or introductory offers to dom...
Firms often enter new markets by taking over an incumbent. We analyze a potential entrant's choice o...
This paper studies the efficacy of entry threats in a contestable environment using experiments. It ...
I report an experiment to evaluate the Contestability thesis where the entrant and the incumbent hav...
I study the effect of sunk entry-costs on potential competition in a multi-market framework, where p...
The role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretica...
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms...
Most earlier experimental tests of the contestable market hypothesis assume a zero opportunity cost ...
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms...
This paper provides a new game theoretic model consistent with the premises of contestable markets. ...
This dissertation is a collection of three essays analyzing the pricing behavior of firms in differe...
Positive effects of multimarket activities on cooperation between firms are widely acknowledged. We ...
Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude...
This dissertation considers organizational problems of market entry. The research follows the experi...
The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the...
This paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive deals or introductory offers to dom...
Firms often enter new markets by taking over an incumbent. We analyze a potential entrant's choice o...
This paper studies the efficacy of entry threats in a contestable environment using experiments. It ...
I report an experiment to evaluate the Contestability thesis where the entrant and the incumbent hav...
I study the effect of sunk entry-costs on potential competition in a multi-market framework, where p...
The role of market accessibility and entry is the central theme of this dissertation. Two theoretica...
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms...
Most earlier experimental tests of the contestable market hypothesis assume a zero opportunity cost ...
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms...
This paper provides a new game theoretic model consistent with the premises of contestable markets. ...
This dissertation is a collection of three essays analyzing the pricing behavior of firms in differe...
Positive effects of multimarket activities on cooperation between firms are widely acknowledged. We ...
Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude...
This dissertation considers organizational problems of market entry. The research follows the experi...
The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the...
This paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive deals or introductory offers to dom...
Firms often enter new markets by taking over an incumbent. We analyze a potential entrant's choice o...