Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers∗

We characterize a monopolist’s optimal offer of service plans when only some subscribers know their demand (type) already at the contracting stage, while others may learn their demand (type) only after incurring some costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, those who are still uninformed purchase tariffs that subsequently allow them to more flexibly adjust their consumed quantity of the service. The presence of uninformed costumers makes it more costly for the firm, in terms of rent left to consumers, to offer the most basic package, which is purchased by informed low-demand customers. Consequently, the firm makes this package relatively unattractive, resulting in a very low quantity of the consumed service. We find that uninformed customers benefit from the presence of informed customers even though information only helps to predict a customer’s own demand (type). However, welfare may be lower if there are more informed customers or if acquiring information at the contracting stage becomes less costly for uninformed customers