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This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether the patent has already been granted, and productive efficiency considerations will determine license timing (which likely will be as early as possible after invention). In contrast, the need for disclosure of unprotected knowledge on the part of the inventor, asymmetric information between the licensor and potential licensees, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. Employing a dataset which combines information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified), we find that pre-allowance licensing is quite common, occurring in about 27 % of our sample. Furthermore, the administrative resolution of uncertainty over patent rights significantly increases the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing agreement, and this effec