ANALYTIC TEACHING Vol. 21, No 1

ccording to the reigning cognitive theories of emotion, human emotions are, in principle, an swerable to reason and amenable to cultivation and coaching, as well as being crucial ingredients in a well-rounded, moral life (e.g. de Sousa, 1987). These theories have obvious educational implica-tions. If their assumptions about the essential rationality and morality of the emotions are correct, educationalists must ask how precisely we can aid the young in the construction and regulation of their emotions. Unfortunately, philosophers and psychologists, even those highly interested in the morality of emotions, are generally loath to descend to such particularities and practicalities. Some feign igno-rance of techniques and teaching methods; others positively take pride in not producing a formal pro-gram of study. For instance, David Carr, in his otherwise enlightening book about moral development and education, chooses to «remain obstinately unrepentant » about not engaging in any discussion of moral didactics, the role of which he consigns to that of «the largely vacuous or the downright fatuous.» Carr is probably right in that most of the «major mistakes about the moral educational role of the teacher » (1991, p. 8) can be traced to misconceptions about the nature of moral knowledge and moral development rather than to faults in curriculum theory or pedagogical techniques (Kristjansson, 2000c). Nevertheless, it would be a matter for grave concern if all moral philosophers were as eager as Carr t