Organized Hypocrisy and the NPT

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is under severe strain. It faces challenges on a number of fronts simultaneously, and it is not clear whether the regime can be adapted successfully to the challenges of the twenty-first century.1 It is undermined by both open and opaque proliferation by non-signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), especially since India, Pakistan, and Israel have seen little in the way of negative consequences as a result of their nuclear weapons programs.2 The uncovering of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network’s activities revealed the extent to which a transnational network could spread nuclear weapons technologies, a blind spot for a treaty regime focused on state-to-state transfers.3 Relevant technology has diffused, and is now traded by non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear ambitions.4 And state parties – North Korea and Iran – have pursued secret activities outside of the inspection regime, raising fears of states taking advantage of the enhanced access to nuclear technology offered by formal adherence to the treaty and availing themselves, once the capability to build a weapon was accomplished, of the treaty’s provisions allowing withdrawal upon three months notice.5 Some have proclaimed a “second nuclear age, ” to which the NPT and th