A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces." Unpublished manuscript

We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in amajority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from amultidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple” voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying vot-ing game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbenc