On Treating Something as a Reason for Action

HEN IS IT EPISTEMICALLY permissible to treat something as a reason for action in practical deliberation?1 According to Hawthorne and Stanley (2008): (KRP) When S’s choice is p-dependent, it is permissible for S to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting if and only if S knows that p.2 In the wake of Hawthorne and Stanley’s article, epistemologists are lining up to argue that we ought to replace a knowledge-based account with some sort of justification-based account. According to Neta (forthcoming), we ought to reject KRP in favor of the weaker principle JBKRP: (JBKRP) When S’s choice is p-dependent, it is permissible for S to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting if and only if S justifiably believes that she knows that p.