This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Down-sian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters ' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some xed distance Æ. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about Æ and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetr...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
The direction model of the electoral process allows limits to candidate mobility or voter perception...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of tw...
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of tw...
This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters are imperfectly inform...
We consider a model of elections in which two office-motivated candidates receive private signals ab...
This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private ...
This work studies a two-candidate single-dimensional Downsian voting model with variable voter turno...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elec-tions. We g...
We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidi-mensional Downsian model o...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
The direction model of the electoral process allows limits to candidate mobility or voter perception...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of tw...
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of tw...
This paper presents a model of Downsian political competition in which voters are imperfectly inform...
We consider a model of elections in which two office-motivated candidates receive private signals ab...
This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private ...
This work studies a two-candidate single-dimensional Downsian voting model with variable voter turno...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elec-tions. We g...
We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidi-mensional Downsian model o...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate e...
The direction model of the electoral process allows limits to candidate mobility or voter perception...