PHILIP KREMER AND ALASDAIR URQUHART SUPERVALUATION FIXED-POINT LOGICS OF TRUTH

ABSTRACT. Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. We also consider variants, engendered by a stronger notion of ‘fixed point’, and by variant supervaluation schemes. A ‘logic ’ is often thought of, not as a consequence relation, but as a set of sentences – the sentences true on each interpretation. We axiomatize the supervaluation fixed-point logics so conceived. KEY WORDS: fixed point logics, languages, truth 1