Recruitment and Selection in Organizations

This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-speci c. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the \u85rm performs noisy interviews. Job-seekerswillingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend both on the wage paid and on the perceived likelihood of being hired, while a noisy interview leads the \u85rm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting hiring standards. I characterize job-seekersequilibrium application decision as well as the \u85rms equilibrium wage and hiring rule. I show that changes in the informativeness of job-seekers assessments, or changes in the informativeness of the \u85rms interview, a¤ect the size and composition of the applicant pool, and can raise hiring costs when it dissuades applications. As a result, the \u85rm may actually favor noisier interviews, or prefer to face applicants that are less certain of their person-job/organization t