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In order to identify an object sensory input must somehow access stored in-formation. A series of results supports two general assertions about this process: First, objects are identified first at a particular level of abstraction which is neither the most general nor the most specific possible. Time to provide names more general than “entry point ” names is predicted by the degree of association be-tween the “entry point ” concept and the required name, not by perceptual fac-tors. In contrast, providing more specific names than that corresponding to the “entry point ” concept does require more detailed perceptual analysis. Second, the particular entry point for a given object covaries with its typicality, which affects whether or not the object will be identified at the “basic ” level. Atypical objects have their entry point at a level subordinate to the basic level. The gen-erality and usefulness of the notion of “basic level ” is discussed in the face of these results. The apparent ease with which people identify common objects belies the subtlety and complexity of the operations and structures involved i