P.G.: Privacy-preserving secure relative localization in vehicular networks

Abstract. Relative location information helps build vehicle topology maps. Such maps provide location information of nearby vehicles to drivers. In building a vehicle topology, one must consider various at-tacks on vehicular networks. Also the localization system should protect the drivers ’ identity privacy and make it difficult for the adversary to track vehicles. Many techniques have been proposed for relative posi-tioning and location verification. Due to the high speed and the strict security requirements, the existing relative positioning and location ver-ification techniques are not directly applicable to vehicular networks. Hence we present a scheme called P-SRLD 1, which securely determines the relative locations of a set of wirelessly connected vehicles based on the relative locations of each vehicle’s surrounding vehicles. P-SRLD uses cryptographic keys to authenticate location messages and uses a vehicle’s cryptographic pseudonym to identify the vehicle to protect drivers ’ pri-vacy. To defend against Sybil attacks, P-SRLD employs registration and relative location message verification mechanisms. It defends wormhole and black hole attacks by probabilistically monitoring losses of relative location messages. Analysis and simulation results show that P-SRLD is lightweight and is resilient to Sybil, wormhole and some other attacks. Key words: vehicle relative localization, privacy, security, vehicular networks