A general model of the geography of illicit retail marketplaces

Abstract: Sellers and buyers of illicit goods and services (e.g., drugs, sex, stolen merchandise, stolen and illegal firearms) must find ways of meeting each other and making exchanges in order to get the rewards they seek. However, they also risk having their money or illicit goods stolen by others or being apprehended by the police. There are two strategies that participants in illicit markets can use to balance risks and rewards. First, they can sell only to people they know or to people who know people they know. This substantially reduces the risk of being arrested or ripped-off, but it restricts sales and buying opportunities. Second, they can sell to strangers. For the seller, this approach provides access to more customers. For the buyer, this approach allows shopping. Nevertheless, it increases participants ' risks of arrest and rip-off. The two strategies to marketing illicit goods and services result in very different geographical patterns of retail marketplaces, the types of places used and the relationship of illicit retailing to licit routine activities. The general model of the geography of illicit retail market places explains these two strategies and why they give rise to very different results. Data from a study of drug markets in San Diego, CA show the plausibility of the general model Implications for prevention, control, displacement and re-search on illicit retail markets are discussed. Pity the plight of the retail drug dealer. He has valuable drugs that he wants to sell. He may also have some cash from previous sales. He wants to make more sales. But if he approaches a possible customer he may be approaching a cop, a person working for cops, or someone who is ready to take his drugs and cash by force. Our dealer must protect himself whil