1 HEURISTICS AS A NORMATIVE DECISION THEORY

Abstract: In order to better understand whether heuristics can comprise a normative decision theory I first explore some common support for heuristics and comment against their importance for the normative questions. Then I examine the role that any normative theory must fill and how we can evaluate and compare them. I conclude (tentatively) that normativity rests on the actions rather than the technique and hence we need some higher-level theory to tell us which sets of actions have greater normative force. Nevertheless there are some identifiable benefits of a heuristic normative theory that lend strong credibility to its superiority as a general decision mechanism and more usefully employed for normative tasks. I finish up by addressing points that are off the main normativity questions but nonetheless often addressed in relation to this topic. Though this paper falls far short of establishing the superiority (or inferiority) of heuristics as a normative decision theory, it does touch upon those factors that must be included in an analysis sufficient to demonstrate superiority (or inferiority) and could serve as a springboard for that later analysis