Trustworthy elections require comprehensive auditing and corrective action to eliminate major errors in counting votes. In this paper, we address just one component of electoral audits: specifying how many randomly selected precincts should undergo hand recounts to decide whether the winner in the electronic tally should be confirmed. Several pending electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of between 2 and 10 % of all precincts. However, percentage-based audits are usually inefficient, because they use large samples for large jurisdictions, even though the sample needed to achieve good accuracy is much more affected by the closeness of the race than the size of the population. Percentage-based audits can also be ineffective, since clo...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect reported outcomes b...
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in th...
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest ...
Several pending federal and state electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 1% to 10% of all ...
Several pending federal and state electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 1 % to 10 % of al...
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes. Prior work i...
Two important components of an audit procedure are the sample size and the decision rule for expandi...
Scientists and politicians are reaching consensus that elections must be countable independently of ...
Vote-tabulation audits can be used to collect evidence that the set of winners of an election (the o...
Abstract: Post-election audits are an important method for verifying the outcome of an election. Rec...
Post-election audits and investigations can produce more transparent, trustworthy, and secure electi...
Voters, candidates, citizens and election officials want high confidence in the integrity of the ele...
U.S. elections rely heavily on computers such as voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks,...
Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcom...
There are many sources of error in counting votes on election day: the apparent winner might not be ...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect reported outcomes b...
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in th...
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest ...
Several pending federal and state electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 1% to 10% of all ...
Several pending federal and state electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 1 % to 10 % of al...
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes. Prior work i...
Two important components of an audit procedure are the sample size and the decision rule for expandi...
Scientists and politicians are reaching consensus that elections must be countable independently of ...
Vote-tabulation audits can be used to collect evidence that the set of winners of an election (the o...
Abstract: Post-election audits are an important method for verifying the outcome of an election. Rec...
Post-election audits and investigations can produce more transparent, trustworthy, and secure electi...
Voters, candidates, citizens and election officials want high confidence in the integrity of the ele...
U.S. elections rely heavily on computers such as voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks,...
Risk-limiting post-election audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcom...
There are many sources of error in counting votes on election day: the apparent winner might not be ...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) guarantee a high probability of correcting incorrect reported outcomes b...
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in th...
We address the problem of auditing an election when precincts may have different sizes, and suggest ...