Macroeconomic Implications of U.S. Banking Liberalisation∗

I develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring fi-nancial frictions in form of collateral constraints for entrepreneurs and imper-fect competition in banking to shed light on the macroeconomic repercussions of U.S. banking deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Banks function as tra-ditional financial intermediaries, transferring funds from private households to entrepreneurs in the economy. Prior to deregulation, banks exploit their market power and charge high interest rates on loans to entrepreneurs. Financial lib-eralisation leads to more vigorous competition among banks, which effectively ameliorates credit market access of investors. I use state–specific calibration and construct model generated panel data to reproduce various regression exercises implemented in related studies. In doing so, I contribute to bridging the gap be-tween my theoretical framework and the vast empirical literature on U.S. banking deregulation. The model succeeds in both qualitatively and quantitatively repli-cating several empirical findings. In particular, bank market integration is associ-ated with (i) an increase in investment in new firms, (ii) a decline in average firm size, (iii) an erosion of the bank capital ratio, (iv) a reduction of state business cycle volatility, and (v) improved consumption risk sharing of entrepreneurs