Abstract: We present approximation and online algorithms for problems of pricing a collection of items for sale so as to maximize the seller’s revenue in an unlimited supply setting. Our first result is an O(k)-approximation algorithm for pricing items to single-minded bidders who each want at most k items. This improves over work of Briest and Krysta (2006) who achieve an O(k2) bound. For the case k = 2, where we obtain a 4-approximation, this can be viewed as the following graph vertex pricing problem: given a (multi) graph G with valuations wi j on the edges, find prices pi ≥ 0 for the vertices to maximize {(i, j):wi j≥pi+p j} (pi + p j). We also improve the approximation of Guruswami et al. (2005) for the “highway problem” in which all ...
We consider a fundamental pricing problem in combinatorial auctions. We are given a set of indivisib...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...
Abstract: We present approximation and online algorithms for problems of pricing a collection of ite...
Abstract: We present approximation and online algorithms for problems of pricing a collection of ite...
We present approximation algorithms for a number of problems of pricing items for sale so as to maxi...
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider the problem of pricing items so as to maximize the profit made from selling these items....
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
There are concise characterizations of optimal mechanisms and monopoly pricings in single-dimensiona...
LNCS v. 6842 has title: Computing and combinatorics : 17th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2...
We consider the problem of pricing items so as to maximize the profit made from selling these items....
We consider a fundamental pricing problem in combinatorial auctions. We are given a set of indivisib...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...
Abstract: We present approximation and online algorithms for problems of pricing a collection of ite...
Abstract: We present approximation and online algorithms for problems of pricing a collection of ite...
We present approximation algorithms for a number of problems of pricing items for sale so as to maxi...
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider a profit maximization problem where we are asked to price a set of m items that are to b...
We consider the problem of pricing items so as to maximize the profit made from selling these items....
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
There are concise characterizations of optimal mechanisms and monopoly pricings in single-dimensiona...
LNCS v. 6842 has title: Computing and combinatorics : 17th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2...
We consider the problem of pricing items so as to maximize the profit made from selling these items....
We consider a fundamental pricing problem in combinatorial auctions. We are given a set of indivisib...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating...