Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International Politics1

Realists assume that states are obsessed with relative gains and that cooperation is the exception rather than the norm in international relations. In contrast, liberal institutionalists assume that state leaders are primarily motivated by absolute gains. This paper probes these critical assumptions and demonstrates how the salience of relative gains varies with the beliefs of the individual, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation. The central hypotheses are tested using a unique methodological approach: a survey instrument coupled with an experimental iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Four central findings emerge from the analysis: 1) the importance of relative gains varies significantly across individuals; 2) the nature of the opponent strongly influences the salience of relative gains; 3) the importance of relative gains declines rapidly as one moves from security to non-security issues; and 4) beliefs identified in the survey systematically influenced play in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. 3Realists argue that power is by definition a relative concept and that due to the anarchical nature of the international system any gain in power by one state represents an inherent threat to its neighbors. Realist, therefore, assume that any potential exchange between states must exactl