This study estimates a model holding companies covering the years 2005, 2007, and 2009 banking crisis, powerful outside levels. However, this shareholder enthusiasm for aftermath of the banking crisis. The evidence suggests, after the height of the crisis, shareholders focused increasingly on the potential downside of CEO risk evidence suggests that bank size, related to incentive pay. The “too pay, but only after the peak of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds incentive pay is found
This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation,...
We investigate the factors driving shareholder value creation following extraordinary financial tran...
We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equit...
We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentive...
The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in exce...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and post-financial...
The 2007-2008 financial crisis was a pervasive shock that profoundly impacted the financial services...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and post-financial...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentive...
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in ...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
Shareholders can utilize internal and external governance mechanisms to minimize agency costs. Inter...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentiv...
This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation,...
We investigate the factors driving shareholder value creation following extraordinary financial tran...
We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equit...
We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentive...
The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in exce...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and post-financial...
The 2007-2008 financial crisis was a pervasive shock that profoundly impacted the financial services...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and post-financial...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentive...
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in ...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
Shareholders can utilize internal and external governance mechanisms to minimize agency costs. Inter...
Usual measures of the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs do not capture the risk-shifting incentiv...
This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation,...
We investigate the factors driving shareholder value creation following extraordinary financial tran...
We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equit...