When What is Useful is Not Necessarily True: The Underappreciated Conceptual Scheme

A major emphasis of research in informing science and its contributing disciplines is the devel-opment of theory. As it is most commonly used, the term theory refers to our attempt to de-scribe—in symbolic terms—some underlying truth. Through developing such descriptions, we seek to improve our understanding of phenomena that occur in the natural or social world and, perhaps, enhance our ability to make predictions of such phenomena. Theory creation and validation, however, are not the only possible goals for research. It is also possible for research to focus on establishing conceptual schemes. These schemes are models that can be used to think about the same types of phenomena described by theory, but are not assumed to be representations of truth. Instead, conceptual schemes are evaluated based upon their useful-ness to a client. This research essay proposes that, as the complexity of the environments we seek to understand and control grows, the goals of “truth ” and “usefulness ” tend to diverge. Where this occurs, an obsession with truth can lead to research impotence: we are motivated to validate truths that are already widely accepted, our theory becomes too convoluted to be applied or communicated, an