Potential Impacts on Competition

The Florida processed orange industry has become more concentrated in the last two decades raising questions on competitive behavior, particularly with respect to the purchase by processors of fruit from Florida orange growers. Has the processor bargaining position been transformed through concentration to a point where it may adversely impact the price that Florida growers receive for their fruit? Whether or not noncompetitive behavior occurs is often difficult to determine but the Federal Government recognized such possibilities when it established antitrust laws in the late 1800s. The Clayton Act makes illegal mergers that significantly reduce competition, while the Robinson-Patman Act makes illegal some types of price discrimination and buying power. In addition to the increase in concentration at the processing level, there has been an increase in concentration at the retail grocery store level, which may adversely impact the prices received by processors for orange juice (OJ) sold to retailers. As a result of grocery store concentration, there may be a greater tendency for retailers to extract lower prices from processors, in turn, possibly resulting in lower prices for growers even without exertion of any buying power by processors on growers