A Supply Side Theory of Third Party Conflict Management

Abstract: We develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on an existing formal model of mediation (Kydd, 2003), we consider the influence of broad, top-down systemic forces on mediator decisions. Our previous work suggests that a strong democratic community and its institutions bolster the likelihood that third party mediation will occur. We integrate this effect of the democratic community into a game theoretic mediation model by adding a simple cost term that punishes a mediator for lying about one side’s resolve for fighting and getting caught. By increasing the supply of credible mediators, global movements toward a strong democratic community increase the likelihood that potential mediators will intervene in contentious conflicts. Empirical analyses of dyadic data from 1816-2001 provide support for our theory, with third party conflict management occurring more frequently when the strength of the democratic community and global institutions rises. We also find that democratic and powerful states serve as mediators more often, and that trade ties