NATURAL RESOURCES, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE

Abstract. This paper seeks to orient future normative work on the resource curse. I do this by specifying the general strategic logic underlying the curse and drawing out the implications of this logic for normative theorizing. The explanation of the curse sketched here claims that the resource curse occurs when the domestic political economy of a resource abundant country is structured such that anyone who attains ultimate control over resource revenue has free reign to pursue policies that are good for the ruling few and bad for the rest. On the basis of this explanation, I argue that we do not have a duty to reform the current rules governing international resource trade, despite the fact that they facilitate unjust resource transactions. Hence, our moral evaluation of the resource curse should focus on (patterns of) transactions rather than international institutions. Finally, I argue that future prescriptive work should focus on identifying credible exit options for curse victims. 1. THE PROBLEM There is a growing consensus among development political economists that countries with an abundance of exportable point-source natural resources (e.g., oil, natural gas, minerals) are more likely to be governed by authoritarian regimes and suffer lower eco-nomic growth rates.1 This so-called ‘resource curse ’ is a moral disaster. Many of the afflicted countries contain a significant percentage of the global poor, including (amon