Coalition Governance in Belgium and The Netherlands: Rising Government Stability Against All Electoral Odds

Electoral changes have left their mark in the coalition politics of Belgium and the Netherlands. In the late 1960s, the lines of loyalty between parties and voters started to unravel, and the tension in government coalitions between cooperation and conflict became more manifest (Andeweg, 1988; Deschouwer, 1994). Electoral competition fed mistrust, and conflicts between coalition parties became a frequent cause of government termination (Müller and Strøm, 2000, 586). The need for a workable modus vivendi for parties in office together led to a practice of negotiating coalition agreements during government formation. These agreements, written by party prominents under a veil of secrecy, became comprehensive documents containing substantive and procedural deals over a broad range of issues, most importantly issues that were controversial (Müller and Strøm, 2000; Timmermans, 2003). As in other countries with multiparty governments, coalition agreements were meant to help contain controversy (Klingemann et al., 1994; Keman, 2002; Timmermans, 2003). Despite ongoing electoral changes and increasing volatility, the longevity of governments in Belgium and the Netherlands has increased, particularly in the last 15 years. In both countries, governments reached the end of their legal term in office more often than before.1 As governments in these countries are always coalitions, threats to survival come from conflicts between or within the parties in office together. However, internal conflict within th