Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos ’ Methodological Account of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change

Theory choice decisions were the focus of the debate on theory change that dominated philosophy of science in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Comparative evaluations of competing theoretical approaches were supposed to form at the same time the nucleus of scientific progress and of scientific rational-ity. A theory choice decision singles out the methodologically most qualified alternative from among a set of rival theories. A sequence of such decisions is supposed to generate a series of theo-ries with increasing methodological virtue; and a series of this kind constitutes scientific progress. Moreover, scientific rationality is tied up with the nature and justification of the criteria brought to bear on theory choice decisions. Rational theory choices are made relying on objective and epis-temically significant criteria. The intertwinement of rationality, theory change and theory choice is among the outstanding commitments underlying the entire debate on “theory dynamics”; in particu-lar, it is constitutive of the methodological approaches of Larry Laudan and, above all, Imre Laka-tos. The backdrop against which this debate unfolded is given by the methodological challenge in-volved in Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. My objective is to elucidate more clearly Lakatos’ attempt to neutralize methodological threats he assumed to be inherent in some of Kuhn’s claims on theory change