B anks make loans that cannot be sold quickly at a high price. Banks issuedemand deposits that allow depositors to withdraw at any time. Thismismatch of liquidity, in which a bank’s liabilities are more liquid than its assets, has caused problems for banks when too many depositors attempt to withdraw at once (a situation referred to as a bank run). Banks have followed policies to stop runs, and governments have instituted deposit insurance to prevent runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) develop a model to explain why banks choose to issue deposits that are more liquid than their assets and to understand why banks are subject to runs. The model has been widely used to understand bank runs and other types of financial crises, as well as ways to pr...
Why are bank deposits demandable when they are also negotiable? We present a General Equilibrium mod...
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of dem...
This paper points out that in the well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking, the full inform...
This article uses narrative and numerical examples to exposit the ideas in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)...
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, i...
Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie...
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they ...
Banks have a vital role to play in financing investment and trade. In recent years, however, they ha...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
This paper incorporates endogenous money creation into the liquidity mismatch problem of Diamond and...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We report evidence from the equity market that unused loan commitments expose banks to systematic li...
Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, w...
This paper examines the effects that capital inflows have on the financial system in a Diamond-Dybvi...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
Why are bank deposits demandable when they are also negotiable? We present a General Equilibrium mod...
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of dem...
This paper points out that in the well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking, the full inform...
This article uses narrative and numerical examples to exposit the ideas in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)...
Loans are illiquid when a lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect them. Consequently, i...
Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie...
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they ...
Banks have a vital role to play in financing investment and trade. In recent years, however, they ha...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
This paper incorporates endogenous money creation into the liquidity mismatch problem of Diamond and...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We report evidence from the equity market that unused loan commitments expose banks to systematic li...
Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, w...
This paper examines the effects that capital inflows have on the financial system in a Diamond-Dybvi...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
Why are bank deposits demandable when they are also negotiable? We present a General Equilibrium mod...
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of dem...
This paper points out that in the well-known Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking, the full inform...