This paper considers the incentive aspect of the Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium (BLCSE), which yields an endogenous theory of profit distribution for public goods economies with convex production technologies. We do so by presenting an incentive compatible mechanism which doubly implements the BLCSE solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria so that Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with BLCSE allocations. The mechanism presented here allows not only preferences and initial endowments, but also coalition patterns to be privately observed. In addition, it works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a publi...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanism for allocating public goods which implements the R...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ra...
We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-eff...
We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-eff...
Abstract. This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations and strong N...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in e±cient allocations f...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in efficient allo-cation...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
Abstract. We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equil...
We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The ...
We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all...
This paper provides a simple, feasible, and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong N...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanism for allocating public goods which implements the R...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a publi...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanism for allocating public goods which implements the R...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ra...
We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-eff...
We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-eff...
Abstract. This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations and strong N...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in e±cient allocations f...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in efficient allo-cation...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
Abstract. We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equil...
We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The ...
We study a continuous and balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all...
This paper provides a simple, feasible, and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong N...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanism for allocating public goods which implements the R...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a publi...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanism for allocating public goods which implements the R...
In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ra...
Add to ORKG