Adaptive Chosen-Message Side-Channel Attacks Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon⋆, François-Xavier Standaert⋆⋆,

Abstract. Most side-channel attacks that have been published in the open literature assume known- or chosen-message adversarial scenarios. In this paper, we analyze the increase of the attacks ’ efficiencies that can be obtained by adaptively selecting the messages. For this purpose, we first describe a generic strategy that allows an adversary to take advan-tage of this capability. We show that it can be applied to any differential power or electromagnetic analysis attack, against unprotected or pro-tected devices and exploiting profiled or non-profiled leakage models. Then, we provide various experiments to quantify these improvements. Finally, we discuss the optimality of our strategy and its implications for the security evaluation of leakage-resilient cryptographic hardware.